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Uzmetal Technology appeared to be a great success—only to
plummet into bankruptcy after the government of Uzbekistan filed
criminal charges against the company’s officers. Uzmetal was a joint
venture between an Israeli metal manufacturer later known as MetalTech and two Uzbek government-owned companies, Almalik Mining
Metallurgy Combinate (AGMK) and the Uzbek Refractory and
Resistant Metals Integrated Plant (UzKTJM). Just as the young
partnership began to turn a profit, however, the Uzbek government
accused it of violating several criminal laws. The venture’s
shareholders commenced involuntary bankruptcy proceedings,
ultimately forcing the company to liquidate. When the Israeli
investor’s claims in bankruptcy were denied, the investor sought
compensation in arbitration. Sensing impropriety, the tribunal
requested discovery regarding millions of dollars in consulting
payments. The tribunal ultimately concluded that those payments
were nothing more than thinly disguised bribes. As a result, the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
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1

tribunal in Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan rejected the investor’s claim.
This marked only the second time in ICSID history that a tribunal has
rejected a claim due to bribery, and the first time a tribunal has done
so for a treaty claim.
This Essay examines Metal-Tech’s treatment of corruption,
building upon the analytical structure set forth in this author’s 2014
2
Note, Streamlining the Corruption Defense. That Note’s framework
for analyzing ICSID awards involving allegations of corruption
proves useful for examining the Metal-Tech award. Implementing that
framework, this Essay concludes that the standard of proof applied by
the tribunal represents a departure from prior ICSID jurisprudence.
It also questions whether an application of comparative fault
principles could have achieved a more just result. Finally, this Essay
argues that the tribunal could have resolved some lingering questions
by staying the proceedings pending the outcome of Uzbekistan’s
domestic corruption investigation.
Part I herein sets forth the facts underlying the dispute. Part II
analyzes the distinctive aspects of the award and the tribunal’s
reasoning. Finally, Part III examines distinctive features of the award
and assesses the award’s implications for future ICSID claims tainted
by bribery.
I. ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE
In 1998, Metal-Tech began negotiations with the government of
Uzbekistan regarding the formation of a partnership to modernize
3
4
the Uzbek molybdenum industry. Uzbekistan had been home to a

1. Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award (Oct. 4,
2013), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012.pdf.
2. Michael A. Losco, Note, Streamlining the Corruption Defense: A Proposed Framework
for FCPA-ICSID Interaction, 63 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2014). For a recent and thorough overview of
investment treaty arbitration cases dealing with corruption, see generally Carolyn B. Lamm,
Brody K. Greenwald & Kristen M. Young, From World Duty Free to Metal-Tech: A Review of
International Investment Treaty Arbitration Cases Involving Allegations of Corruption, 29 ICSID
REV. 328 (2014).
3. Molybdenum is a “metallic element used to enhance the strength, durability, and
corrosion resistance of steel, cast iron, and superalloys.” Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 1 n.2. “The versatility of molybdenum in enhancing a variety of alloy
properties has ensured it a significant role in contemporary industrial technology, which
increasingly requires materials that are serviceable under high stress, expanded temperature
ranges, and highly corrosive environments . . . . Few of molybdenum’s uses have acceptable
substitutes.” Molybdenum Statistics and Information, USGS MINERALS INFO.,
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/molybdenum (last visited Oct. 23, 2014).
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flourishing molybdenum industry in the 1980s, but the sector had
fared poorly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. AGMK,
Uzbekistan’s only molybdenum-mining company, used such outdated
technology that it was unable to produce molybdenum concentrate of
acceptable quality for sale on the global market. Its extraction process
was both dirty and inefficient. Unable to export its products,
AGMK’s sales were confined to a sole local customer, UzKTJM.
UzKTJM was Uzbekistan’s “primary producer and exporter of
molybdenum products,” but the low quality of AGMK’s concentrate
5
prevented UzKTJM from producing high-quality export products.
UzKTJM therefore utilized only a fraction of its capacity, and by 1998
it was operating at a loss and falling into debt. Both of these
struggling entities were owned by the government of Uzbekistan.
In January 2000, after conducting a feasibility study and
receiving authorization from the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers, MetalTech and the Uzbek companies established the joint venture Uzmetal
Technology. Metal-Tech would “contribute its technology, know-how
and access to international markets as well as part of the financing
6
needed for a new plant”; AGMK and UzKTJM would contribute
buildings, equipment, and raw materials. Metal-Tech would act as a
middleman for the venture, purchasing all of Uzmetal’s products and
7
selling them on the global market. Metal-Tech was to receive a 50
percent stake in the venture in exchange for a capital contribution of
8
$500,000. The total value of the project was expected to exceed $19
million.
Uzmetal’s facilities opened in October 2002, and by 2005 the
venture was turning a profit. In May 2006, Uzmetal’s General
Meeting of Participants decided to distribute dividends. But less than
a month later, the Public Prosecutor’s Office for the Tashkent Region
initiated criminal proceedings “on the ground that officials of
Uzmetal had abused their authority and caused harm to
9
Uzbekistan.” Uzbekistan’s Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution
abrogating Uzmetal’s rights to purchase raw materials and, according

4. Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 7. At the time, Metal-Tech was
known as Metek Metal Technology, Ltd. Id. ¶ 1 n.1.
5. Id. ¶ 7.
6. Id. ¶ 10.
7. Id. ¶ 27.
8. Id. ¶ 15.
9. Id. ¶ 37.
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to Metal-Tech, “cancel[ing] its exclusive right to export Uzmetal’s
10
refined molybdenum oxide.”
A frenzy of legal proceedings followed. UzKTJM sued to enforce
distribution of its share of the May 2006 dividends, which alone
amounted to over $162 million. On the same day, Uzmetal brought
suit to invalidate the decision to distribute dividends, but the
Tashkent District Economic Court dismissed Uzmetal’s claim. Days
later, “UzKTJM initiated bankruptcy proceedings against Uzmetal on
11
the basis of Uzmetal’s failure to pay the dividends.” The court
placed Uzmetal in bankruptcy under the supervision of a temporary
manager, who rejected Metal-Tech’s bankruptcy claims.
Consequently, AGMK and UzKTJM, as the only recognized creditors
of Uzmetal, met and voted to liquidate the venture. On January 14,
2008, less than five months after the beginning of bankruptcy
proceedings, the Uzbek Court of Cassation initiated the liquidation of
Uzmetal. Those proceedings lasted until late 2009; that December,
12
“Uzmetal was delisted from the state registry of legal entities.”
II. THE AWARD
This Part begins by reviewing the important procedural aspects
of the arbitration. It then outlines the arguments of the parties, and it
concludes by explaining the tribunal’s decision and reasoning.
A. Arbitration Proceedings
On January 26, 2010, Metal-Tech submitted a Request for
Arbitration to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, pursuant to the consent given in Article 8 of the Israel13
Uzbekistan Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Metal-Tech sought
declarations that Uzbekistan had breached international law, Uzbek
law, and certain provisions of the Israel-Uzbekistan BIT by failing to
accord its investment fair and equitable treatment, failing to provide
full and constant protection and security, and by expropriating the
investment without due process of law and without payment of

10. Id. ¶ 38.
11. Id. ¶ 46.
12. Id. ¶ 53.
13. For more information about the ICSID, the requirement of consent to ICSID
arbitration, and bilateral investment treaties, see Losco, supra note 2, at 1205–09.
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14

It sought
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.
15
compensation of approximately $174 million.
Prior to the January 2012 hearing on jurisdiction and liability,
Uzbekistan notified the tribunal that the Uzbek Prosecutor General
had commenced an investigation into Uzmetal’s participation in a
criminal enterprise involving kickbacks to Uzbek government
16
officials. At the January hearing, Metal-Tech’s chairman, Ariel
Rosenberg, revealed that Metal-Tech had made payments totaling
approximately $4 million to several consultants for “lobbyist activity”
17
under consulting agreements dating back to 1998. This revelation
directly contradicted previously submitted evidence indicating that
the consultants were hired in 2005 “for assistance with Uzmetal’s day18
19
to-day operations.” Feeling it had a “duty to inquire,” the tribunal
ordered further discovery regarding the consulting payments
20
pursuant to its authority under Article 43 of the ICSID Convention.
The tribunal observed that the evidence raised a number of
21
internationally accepted “red flags” for corruption. These red flags
included the size of the payments made to the consultants; the lack of
proof that the consultants provided any legitimate services; the
consultants’ lack of qualifications or experience in the sector; their
connections with public officials in charge of the investment; and the
conclusion of sham contracts with mysterious foreign entities
“designed to conceal the true nature of the relationship among the
22
parties.”
The consulting payments, which amounted to nearly 20 percent
of the entire project cost, exceeded Metal-Tech’s initial cash
23
contribution to the joint venture and far exceeded local salaries. The

14. Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 55.
15. Id. ¶ 108.
16. Id. ¶ 76.
17. Id. ¶ 86.
18. Sebastian Perry, Uzbek claim dismissed because of corruption, GLOBAL ARB. REV.
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32072/uzbek-claim-dismissedcorruption; Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 86.
19. Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 241.
20. Id. ¶¶ 86, 92; see Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, art. 43, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159.
21. Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 293.
22. Id. ¶ 218.
23. Id. ¶ 199. One of the consultants received a salary of $100 per month from Uzmetal yet
received a $5,000 per month “bonus” from Metal-Tech. Id. ¶ 200.

LOSCO IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

42

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

11/15/2014 4:19 PM

[Vol. 64:37

consulting contracts required that the consultants be paid regardless
24
of the services they rendered, and Metal-Tech repeatedly failed to
provide evidence of the services provided in exchange for their
25
“substantial compensation.” None of the consultants possessed any
professional qualification for the services they were supposedly hired
to perform, and none had any experience in the molybdenum
26
industry. These “consultants” included a retired police investigator
27
who happened to be the brother of the Uzbek prime minister, a
28
pharmaceutical scientist and newspaper manager, and a human
29
resources functionary in the office of the president of Uzbekistan.
Moreover, the vast majority of payments were made indirectly,
through opaque Swiss and British Virgin Islands holding companies
owned by the consultants, rather than directly to the consultants
30
themselves.
B. Arguments of the Parties
Uzbekistan objected to the tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction,
alleging that Metal-Tech had “engaged in corruption and made
fraudulent and material misrepresentations to gain approval for its
31
investment.” The Israel-Uzbekistan BIT contained a legality
provision requiring that a covered investment be implemented in
accordance with the laws of the host state; Uzbek law made it a crime
32
to give or receive a bribe, directly or through an intermediary.
Because Metal-Tech had engaged in corruption at the time of the
procurement of the contract, it argued, the investment had been
“implemented” in violation of Uzbek law, negating Uzbekistan’s
33
consent to arbitration.
Metal-Tech argued that the definition of “implemented”
required that the investment be made, not operated, in violation of
34
host state law in order to defeat jurisdiction. It argued that the
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. ¶ 204.
Id. ¶ 207.
Id. ¶ 208.
Id. ¶¶ 210, 226.
Id. ¶ 212.
Id. ¶ 209.
Id. ¶¶ 219–224.
Id. ¶ 110.
Id. ¶ 282.
Id. ¶¶ 110, 372–373.
Id. ¶¶ 176, 180.
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investment had not been made in violation of Uzbek law, meaning
that Metal-Tech had not violated the legality requirement and that
therefore Uzbekistan’s consent to arbitration remained valid. MetalTech further argued that the BIT’s most favored nation (MFN)
provision required that the tribunal incorporate the more favorable
definition of “investment” contained in the Greece-Uzbekistan BIT,
35
which did not include a legality requirement.
C. The Tribunal’s Decision and Reasoning
The tribunal concluded that the word “implemented” in Article
1(1) of the BIT meant that an investment must be established in
accordance with the laws of its host state, but that the provision was
36
silent on whether it must also be operated in accordance with law.
The tribunal also concluded that, absent agreement by the parties to
the contrary, the MFN clause did not permit importation of a more
favorable definition of investment because the terms “investment”
37
and “investor” were used in the MFN provision itself. A claimant
must first have an investment “under the treaty to claim through the
38
treaty.”
Because the BIT was silent with respect to presumptions, burden
shifting, and inferences to be drawn from a lack of evidence, the
tribunal determined that it had “relative freedom in determining the
39
standard necessary to sustain a determination of corruption.”
Applying the widely recognized international standard that each
party bears the burden of proving the facts on which it relies, the
tribunal inquired whether corruption had been established with
40
“reasonable certainty.” It declared that because corruption is
difficult to establish, it can be proved through circumstantial
41
evidence. Without asserting that Uzbekistan had established the
existence of corruption prima facie, the tribunal noted that the facts
42
did establish suspicions of corruption. It therefore required
43
explanations regarding those suspicions. Moreover, it would draw
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. ¶¶ 132, 135.
Id. ¶ 185.
Id. ¶¶ 144–145.
Id. ¶ 145.
Id. ¶¶ 237–238.
Id. ¶ 243.
Id.
Id. ¶ 239.
Id.
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appropriate inferences against Metal-Tech for its failure to produce
44
evidence that it had been ordered to produce.
Because Metal-Tech was unable to rebut the suspicions of illicit
conduct, the tribunal concluded that Metal-Tech had engaged in
45
corruption in violation of Uzbek law. Accordingly, it determined
that the investment had not been implemented in accordance with the
46
laws of the host state as required by Article 1(1) of the BIT.
Uzbekistan’s consent to arbitration in Article 8(1) of the BIT
therefore did not apply to claims arising from the joint venture, and
47
the tribunal could not assert jurisdiction over the dispute. As a result
of its inability to assert jurisdiction over Metal-Tech’s claims, it also
48
lacked jurisdiction over Uzbekistan’s counterclaims.
Noting that it had discretion to allocate costs, the tribunal
ordered the parties to bear their own expenses and to split the fees
49
charged by ICSID. It observed that the presence of corruption had
deprived Metal-Tech of protection and relieved Uzbekistan of any
50
liability. However, Uzbekistan had participated in the same
51
corruption that allowed it to escape liability. Indeed, such
52
participation “is implicit in the very nature of corruption.” It was
therefore fair, the tribunal reasoned, for the parties to share the costs
53
of the arbitration.
III. MAKING SENSE OF METAL-TECH
How does the Metal-Tech tribunal’s reasoning compare to that of
past tribunals? What are the implications of the tribunal’s decision,
and what could it have done differently? This Part begins by
examining the significant attributes of the award with a view to
assessing how it resembles and differs from previous ICSID
jurisprudence. Next, this Part compares the evidentiary burden and
standard of proof applied by the tribunal to the standards applied by

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. ¶ 245.
Id. ¶¶ 239, 372, 390.
Id. ¶ 373.
Id. ¶¶ 239, 372, 390.
Id. ¶ 413.
Id. ¶ 423.
Id. ¶ 422.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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past tribunals. It notes that Metal-Tech’s application of a relatively
low standard of proof, combined with a reliance on circumstantial
evidence and a willingness to shift the burden of proof to the
claimant, marks a shift away from the evidentiary approaches used by
other ICSID tribunals. Next, this Part observes that lingering
questions remain about the true nature of the corruption at play. It
concludes by arguing that these questions could have been resolved if
the parties and tribunal had been willing to wait for evidence
uncovered by a domestic investigation.
Streamlining the Corruption Defense identifies four legal
attributes that are relevant to evaluating the treatment of corruption
in ICSID arbitration. These include: (1) the nature of the wrongful
conduct; (2) the law applied by the tribunal; (3) the evidentiary
burden and standard of proof; and (4) the remedy afforded to the
54
claimant. Together, these attributes provide a useful conceptual
framework for analyzing the Metal-Tech award.
First, as noted by the tribunal, Metal-Tech’s consulting payments
constituted mutual corruption in the procurement of the investment.
It is not apparent, however, whether they were “soft” or “hard” in
character because it is unclear how the funds paid to the consultants
were ultimately used. At least one of the consultants was a public
official himself, but he seems not to have had direct authority over
the approval of the project. If the consultants retained the funds
themselves in exchange for exerting undue influence on public
55
officials, the payments would constitute “soft” corruption.
Alternatively, if they funneled some of the funds to public officials as
56
bribes, the payments would constitute “hard” corruption.
Second, the Metal-Tech tribunal’s decision was based on the
legality of the investment (accordance with laws), as opposed to an
international or transnational public policy, or good faith. Taking a
minimalist approach, the tribunal declined to apply the concept of
international public policy to the case at hand because it would be
unnecessary to do so after having determining that it lacked
57
jurisdiction to hear the case.
Third, the tribunal assessed the evidence of corruption under a
“reasonable certainty” standard, drawing inferences from
54.
55.
56.
57.

For an explanation of each of these characteristics, see Losco, supra note 2, at 1218–31.
See Losco, supra note 2, at 1220.
See id. at 1220–21.
Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 374.
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circumstantial evidence. It declared that the “factual matrix d[id] not
require the tribunal to resort to presumptions or rules of burden of
58
proof.”
Finally, the remedy was jurisdictional in nature. Metal-Tech’s
failure to implement its investment in accordance with Uzbek law
negated Uzbekistan’s consent to arbitration, and as a result the
tribunal could not claim jurisdiction over the dispute.
Neither the nature of the wrongful conduct, nor the law applied
by the tribunal, nor the remedy applied differed significantly from the
experience of prior ICSID tribunals. This Essay will proceed by
analyzing the attribute that stands out most from prior ICSID
jurisprudence: the tribunal’s novel approach to assessing the evidence
of corruption.
A. A New Course: Standard of Proof and ICSID Jurisprudence
Metal-Tech is the first ICSID decision to deny an investor’s BIT
59
claim due to bribery. In this respect, the award is important because
it suggests a new approach for dealing with bribery in BIT claims.
One particularly interesting aspect of the award is its approach to the
standard of proof for corruption claims. The tribunal noted that
although it was “not bound by previous decisions of ICSID or other
60
arbitral tribunals,” it should pay those decisions “due regard.” It
further noted that, absent “compelling reasons to the contrary,” it had
a “duty to follow solutions” consistently established in comparable
61
cases. Yet the tribunal embarked down its own path while creatively
construing existing ICSID jurisprudence to give the impression that it
was following in the footsteps of prior tribunals.
ICSID tribunals have generally applied high standards of proof
62
to corruption allegations. Metal-Tech marks a departure from this
63
chain of ICSID jurisprudence. Siag v. Egypt applied a “clear and

58. Id. ¶ 243.
59. See Lamm et al., supra note 2, at 329; Losco, supra note 2, at 1219.
60. Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 116.
61. Id.
62. Losco, supra note 2, at 1228–30; see also Florian Haugeneder & Christoph Liebscher,
Corruption and Investment Arbitration: Substantive Standards and Proof, in AUSTRIAN
ARBITRATION YEARBOOK 2009, at 538, 555–56 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2009)
(“Establishing corruption is, as a matter of fact, difficult.”).
63. Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award (June 1, 2009),
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0786_0.pdf.
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64

convincing evidence” standard, over the dissent of arbitrator
Francisco Orrego Vicuña, who argued for the application of a lower
standard permitting the tribunal discretion to make inferences from
65
“concordant circumstantial evidence.” Other tribunals have applied
a high burden of proof but have declined to define the precise
66
burden.
Metal-Tech, on the other hand, applied a standard of “reasonable
67
certainty.” The tribunal noted that because corruption is difficult to
establish, it is “generally admitted that it can be shown through
68
circumstantial evidence.” In support of this proposition, the tribunal
69
cited the 2012 Oostergetel award—an arbitration under the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
70
Rules. Oostergetel in turn cited a third award, Rumeli Telekom, for
the proposition that corruption can be proven by circumstantial
71
evidence. However, the Oostergetel tribunal found that such
72
evidence was entirely lacking in the case before it. The Rumeli
tribunal, dealing with allegations of conspiracy rather than bribery,
concluded that because direct evidence of a conspiracy is unlikely to
be available, circumstantial evidence may suffice to support such an
allegation—but only if that evidence “leads clearly and convincingly
73
to the inference that a conspiracy has occurred.”

64. Id. ¶ 326.
65. Siag, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Francisco
Orrego Vicuña at 4 (quoting ABDULHAY SAYED, CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 93–94 (2004)).
66. TSA Spectrum de Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5,
Award, ¶¶ 172–175 (Dec. 19, 2008), 48 I.L.M. 496 (2009); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶ 111 (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896 (2002). See
generally Losco, supra note 2, at 1229–30 & nn.209–11 (contrasting the “clear and convincing
evidence” standard of Siag with the undefined standards applied by other tribunals).
67. Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 243
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012.pdf.
68. Id.
69. Oostergetel v. Slovak Republic, Final Award, ¶ 303 (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0933.pdf. It is interesting to note
that Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler presided over both the Metal-Tech and Oostergetel
tribunals. Id.
70. Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award,
¶ 709 (July 29, 2008), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0728.pdf.
71. Oostergetel, Final Award, ¶ 303.
72. Id.
73. Rumeli Telekom, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 709.
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Here, the tribunal seems to have followed the approach
advocated by Orrego Vicuña, admitting the difficulty of proving
corruption and basing its conclusion on evidence adduced by
Uzbekistan combined with Metal-Tech’s inability to explain away the
74
resulting “suspicions.” Though commercial arbitration tribunals
75
have occasionally deployed similar reasoning, Metal-Tech is the first
ICSID tribunal to find the existence of corruption using this
76
strategy. Whether this burden-shifting approach catches on among
future ICSID tribunals will likely depend on the peculiar facts of
future cases and the weight future tribunals accord to Metal-Tech’s
77
reasoning.
B. A Blunt Remedy
Metal-Tech demonstrated that resolution of corruption
allegations at the jurisdictional stage is a blunt remedy. Here, the
division of costs seems to be a signal that the tribunal perceived
inequity in the result. Uzbekistan was able to invoke Metal-Tech’s
corrupt conduct as an absolute bar to its own liability, even though at
least one Uzbek official took part in that conduct. The tribunal
therefore sought to levy some penalty on the host state for its
complicity in the corrupt activity; unable to exercise jurisdiction over
the merits of the dispute, the tribunal had to use its only remaining
tool—costs—to do so.
But Uzbekistan suffered another penalty for its complicity in the
corrupt conduct before the Metal-Tech tribunal. Because the tribunal
could not assert jurisdiction, it rejected Uzbekistan’s counterclaims
against Metal-Tech. Lacking jurisdiction over the dispute, the tribunal
was unable to adjudicate the claims of either party. The loss of
counterclaims is a significant attribute of the outcome, especially
considering that Peru recently settled three claims against investors
78
for $40 million. States may be less inclined to taint investments with
corrupt conduct if investment arbitration is a two-way street. In other

74. Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶¶ 239, 372.
75. Haugeneder & Liebscher, supra note 62, at 552–55.
76. See Losco, supra note 2, at 1219.
77. See Haugeneder & Liebscher, supra note 62, at 555–56 (“[E]valuation of evidence is
more important than the abstract definition of the applied standard.”).
78. Peru settles trio of power line claims, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32533/peru-settles-trio-power-line-claims.
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words, states can utilize investment arbitration as a forum to recover
for harm suffered due to investors’ conduct.
Perhaps even more potent than the loss of counterclaims are the
reputational effects of a corruption finding. As one commentator has
79
observed, it may well signal “game over” for corrupt host countries.
80
The increasing frequency and visibility of investor-state arbitrations
suggests that the availability of this forum has become an important
consideration for investors. Some evidence suggests that corruption
81
matters to investors. A robust corruption defense should elevate the
importance of corruption relative to the quality of host state
institutions, since corruption can deprive investors of an important
forum for dispute resolution. By giving investors something to lose,
we should expect to see the correlation between corruption and
reduced inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) become even
stronger.
As noted in Streamlining the Corruption Defense, recognizing a
comparative fault standard for corruption might be another way to
82
penalize the host state for its complicity. In cases like Metal-Tech
where the remedy is jurisdictional, however, a tribunal would have no
legal basis for applying such a standard. Before awarding damages
according to relative culpability, the tribunal would have to create a
legal fiction in order to assert jurisdiction. This would be tantamount
83
to an exercise of the tribunal’s power ex aequo et bono, which
requires the consent of the parties. To do so without the parties’
consent would constitute an excess of powers and potentially a failure
to state the reasons on which the award is based, both of which are
84
grounds for annulment of the award.

79. Tamar Meshel, Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan – ‘Strike Two’ Against
Investor Claimants Facing the Corruption Defense, INTLAWGRRLS (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://ilg2.org/2013/12/18/metal-tech-ltd-v-republic-of-uzbekistan-strike-two-against-investorclaimants-facing-the-corruption-defense/.
80. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Investor–State Disputes: Prevention and
Alternatives to Arbitration 4, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11 (2010).
81. Ali Al-Sadig, Effects of Corruption on FDI Inflows, 29 CATO J. 267, 289 (2009),
available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2009/5/cj29n2-4.pdf.
82. Losco, supra note 2, at 1219–20.
83. The power to decide disputes ex aequo et bono “free[s] the decision-maker from the
rigidities of positive law” and “permit[s] considerations of equity, justice and fairness.”
Christoph Schreuer, Decisions Ex Aequo et Bono Under the ICSID Convention, 11 ICSID REV.
37, 37 (1996), available at http://icsidreview.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/1/37.full.pdf.
84. Id. at 53.
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C. A Better Approach?
The Metal-Tech tribunal proved itself adept at uncovering
corruption by shifting the evidentiary burden to the claimant and
according substantial weight to circumstantial evidence. However,
Uzbek domestic law enforcement authorities played an indispensable
role in the case. The tribunal never would have been alerted to the
presence of corruption if not for the intervention of domestic
authorities. Even after the issuance of the award, lingering questions
remain regarding the true nature of the parties’ corrupt conduct.
85
Because the parties produced limited evidence of corruption, we do
not know how the funds paid to the consultants were ultimately used.
Were they were retained by the consultants themselves in exchange
for exerting undue influence on public officials, or were some of the
funds funneled to public officials as bribes? If the tribunal had stayed
the case pending the outcome of a domestic investigation, it could
have directed Uzbekistan to produce the records of that investigation.
Streamlining the Corruption Defense advocates precisely such a
86
strategy. Unlike claimants, who may refuse to cooperate even when
87
a tribunal orders the production of evidence, respondent states have
an incentive to uncover and produce evidence of corruption. Though
the tribunal here proved adept at uncovering corrupt conduct, state
law enforcement authorities likely have greater ability to gather
evidence than an arbitral tribunal. Though this might raise concerns
about incentivizing badly behaved host states to abuse their authority,
it would ensure the availability of the best evidence possible. The
tribunal would retain discretion to decide on the admissibility and
weight of that evidence. It could discount, or refuse to recognize
altogether, evidence gathered in an unfair or abusive fashion. Parties
and tribunals would simply need to assess whether the potential for
enhanced accuracy is worth the delay.

85. The tribunal’s finding of corruption was based in large part on the testimony of one
witness, Metal-Tech’s chairman Ariel Rosenberg. “[T]he Claimant did not proffer any witness
(other than Mr. Rosenberg) in support of its submission that legitimate services were rendered
by the Consultants.” Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3,
Award, ¶ 263 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012.pdf.
Uzbekistan’s only oral testimony came from one of Metal-Tech’s paid consultants, who was in
Uzbek prison and admitted to cooperating in hopes that he might receive a reduction in his
sentence. As a result, the tribunal did not accord any weight to his testimony. Uzbekistan did
not allege corruption on the part of its witness. Id. ¶¶ 365–366.
86. Losco, supra note 2, at 1239–41.
87. Haugeneder & Liebscher, supra note 62, at 556.
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CONCLUSION
Metal-Tech is a significant development in ICSID corruption
jurisprudence, applying a novel standard of proof to evidence of
corruption. To be clear, Metal-Tech is not a complete departure from
the accepted rules or practice regarding evidence in international
arbitration. But it does mark a new approach to allegations of
corruption in ICSID arbitration. The award also demonstrated that
declining jurisdiction is a blunt remedy. Because reputational
consequences are not immediately visible at the time an award is
rendered, dismissing claims due to corruption may, as here, be an
unpalatable decision for arbitrators. The loss of the host state’s
counterclaims is more readily apparent, but the strength of that
incentive depends in large part on the underlying facts of the specific
investment. Still, tribunals should not underestimate the reputational
effects of a corruption finding.
Moreover, the outcome of the dispute hinged on the tribunal’s
interpretation of the BIT’s legality requirement and of Uzbek
anticorruption law. However, treaty provisions and domestic
anticorruption laws differ by country. If Uzbekistan had no
corruption law at all, for example, its consent to arbitration would
have remained valid despite the existence of a legality requirement in
the BIT. Would the tribunal have invoked principles of good faith or
international public policy as a backstop? If the BIT lacked an
explicit legality requirement, would the tribunal have found one to be
88
implied? These are questions that future ICSID tribunals may be
called upon to address.
The Metal-Tech tribunal’s decision also left some lingering
questions about the nature of the corruption at play. Who were the
ultimate recipients of the consulting payments? How many
government officials were involved, and how high-ranking were they?
Given the bluntness of the jurisdictional remedy, the answers to
questions like these will impact our notions about the fairness of the
results in cases involving allegations of corruption. Tribunals will have
a better chance of formulating these answers if they enlist the
investigative capabilities of host states. Finally, it remains to be seen
whether future ICSID tribunals will follow Metal-Tech’s lead or
whether they will apply higher standards of proof, as past tribunals

88. Uzbekistan raised precisely this argument, Metal-Tech, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3,
Award, ¶ 110, but the tribunal declined to address it. Id. ¶ 163.
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have done. At the very least, Metal-Tech demonstrates that
corruption in the formation of an investment will continue to act as a
bar to recovery for claimants.

